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Whence deep realism for Everettian quantum mechanics?

Arroyo, Raoni and Arenhart, Jonas R. B. (2022) Whence deep realism for Everettian quantum mechanics? Foundations of Physics, 52 (121). ISSN 1572-9516

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Abstract

`Shallow' and `deep' versions of scientific realism may be distinguished as follows: the shallow realist is satisfied with belief in the existence of the posits of our best scientific theories; by contrast, deep realists claim that realism can be legitimate only if such entities are described in metaphysical terms. We argue that this methodological discussion can be fruitfully applied in Everettian quantum mechanics, specifically on the debate concerning the existence of worlds and the recent dispute between Everettian actualism and quantum modal realism. After presenting what is involved in such dispute, we point to a dilemma for realists: either we don't have the available metaphysical tools to answer the deep realist's demands, and realism is not justified in this case, or such demands of metaphysical dressing are not mandatory for scientific realism, and deep versions of realism are not really required.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Arroyo, Raonirwarroyo@unicamp.br0000-0002-3800-8505
Arenhart, Jonas R. B.jonas.becker2@gmail.com
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Foundations of Physics.
Keywords: Everettian actualism; Everettian quantum mechanics; possible worlds; quantum modal realism; scientific realism.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Raoni Arroyo
Date Deposited: 22 May 2025 12:35
Last Modified: 22 May 2025 12:35
Item ID: 25398
Journal or Publication Title: Foundations of Physics
Publisher: Springer
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10701-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/s10701-022-00643-0
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 9 November 2022
Volume: 52
Number: 121
ISSN: 1572-9516
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25398

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