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Doubt and suspension: Two attitudes or one?

Guilielmo, Benoit (2025) Doubt and suspension: Two attitudes or one? THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 39 (3). pp. 315-331. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Are doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Guilielmo, Benoitbenoit.guilielmo@uzh.ch0000-0002-4224-1406
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: doubt, suspension of judgement, belief, epistemology, mental states
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2025 12:35
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2025 12:35
Item ID: 25583
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.26419
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Date: 2025
Page Range: pp. 315-331
Volume: 39
Number: 3
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25583

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