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Truth, Understanding, and Normativity in Scientific Models

Spagnesi, Lorenzo (2025) Truth, Understanding, and Normativity in Scientific Models. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Scientific models often contain assumptions known not to be true. Despite being false representations, models provide us with a key understanding of phenomena. What is more, the falsehoods that figure in models are in many cases central to them, and there is no available alternative to their use. If falsehoods play such an irreplaceable role in our understanding of phenomena, it would seem that truth is not a key concern of scientific modeling. In this paper, I assess the prospects and challenges of reconciling truth and understanding in scientific modeling. More specifically, I review a thesis recently emerging in the literature, what I shall call the Derivation Thesis (DT), according to which we use models to derive true information. First, I examine different versions of the thesis and develop what I take to be its most promising formulation (what I call the generalized DT). Second, I discuss a serious challenge to the generalized DT. I consider a thought experiment in which an unreliable astrological model gives true explanations by fluke. This scenario challenges the idea that models can provide genuine understanding by generating truths. In response, I argue that genuine scientific models also fulfill a specific normative role that epistemically lucky models lack (what I call the normative generalized DT). I test this hypothesis by analysing how the Ideal Gas Law advances scientific understanding of real gases.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Spagnesi, Lorenzospagnesi@uni-trier.de0000-0003-2483-909X
Keywords: truth; understanding; normativity; models; explanation
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Dr. Lorenzo Spagnesi
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2025 12:46
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2025 12:46
Item ID: 25607
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25607

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