Justin, Martin (2025) More Hope for Conciliationism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The view that epistemic peers should conciliate in cases of disagreement---the Conciliatory View---had been an important view in the early days of the peer disagreement debate. Over the years, however, the view has been the target of severe criticism; an ''obituary'' was already written for the view, and, as a recent proclamation has it, there is ''no hope'' for it. In this paper, I will argue that we should keep the hope alive by defending the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement. The primary strategy of my defense will be to separate the claims made by the view specific to peer disagreement and claims that concern higher-order evidence more generally. This separation allows us to see which problems cannot be addressed in the context of peer disagreement alone. As I will argue, the upshot of making this distinction is that although the jury is still out on whether higher-order evidence should affect our first-order doxastic states, the Conciliatory View likely follows if it does.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Justin, Martin martin.justin1@um.si 0000-0002-2614-9423
Additional Information:	Justin M. More Hope for Conciliationism. Episteme. Published online 2025:1-21. doi:10.1017/epi.2025.22
Keywords:	peer disagreement, higher-order evidence, the conciliatory view, epistemology of disagreement, self-undermining
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Mr. Martin Justin
Date Deposited:	19 Jun 2025 13:37
Last Modified:	19 Jun 2025 13:37
Item ID:	25740
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/a...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.22
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	19 June 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25740

Available Versions of this Item

• More Hope for Conciliationism. (deposited 11 May 2025 15:05)
  • More Hope for Conciliationism. (deposited 19 Jun 2025 13:37) [Currently Displayed]

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