Arroyo, Raoni and Morganti, Matteo (2025) Naturalistic Metaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn’t Lead to Realism about Metaphysics. Synthese, 206 (6). ISSN 1573-0964
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Abstract
In recent work, Nina Emery has defended the view that, in the context of naturalistic metaphysics, one should maintain the same epistemic attitude towards science and metaphysics. That is, naturalists who are scientific realists ought to be realists about metaphysics as well; and naturalists who are antirealists about science should also be antirealists about metaphysics. We call this the ‘parity thesis’. This paper suggests that the parity thesis is widely, albeit often implicitly, accepted among naturalistically inclined philosophers, and essentially for reasons similar to Emery’s. Then, reasons are provided for resisting Emery’s specific inference from scientific realism to realism about metaphysics. The resulting picture is a more nuanced view of the relationship between science and metaphysics within the naturalistic setting than the one which is currently most popular.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | Meta-metaphysics; metaphysics and science; naturalistic metaphysics; realism and antirealism. | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Raoni Arroyo | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 20 Jun 2025 13:28 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 20 Jun 2025 13:28 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 25743 | |||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Synthese | |||||||||
| Publisher: | Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.) | |||||||||
| Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0... | |||||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s11229-025-05075-7 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Date: | 19 June 2025 | |||||||||
| Volume: | 206 | |||||||||
| Number: | 6 | |||||||||
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25743 |
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Naturalistic Metaphysics and the Parity Thesis: Why Scientific Realism Doesn’t Lead to Realism about Metaphysics. (deposited 13 May 2025 13:03)
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