PhilSci Archive

The Possibility of a General Theory of Normativity in Light of the Number-Counts-Debate

Spiegel, Irina (2025) The Possibility of a General Theory of Normativity in Light of the Number-Counts-Debate. [Preprint]

[img] Text
general-normativity-number-counts-debate-spiegel.pdf

Download (222kB)

Abstract

This article revisits Taurek’s famous question: Should the greater number be saved in situations of resource scarcity? At the heart of this debate lies a central issue in normative ethics—whether numerical superiority can constitute a moral pro tanto reason. Engaging with this question helps to illuminate core principles of normative theory. Welfarism$^{min}$ presents a pro-number position. The article first outlines Taurek’s original argument. It then examines non-welfarist responses and explains why they remain unsatisfactory. Finally, it identifies the main shortcomings of the hybrid welfarism$^{min}$ approach and suggests a possible alternative for more adequately addressing the Taurek problem.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Spiegel, Irinairina.spiegel@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Keywords: Number-counts-debate, aggregation, welfarism, neo-contractualism, Taurek problem.
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Dr. Irina Spiegel
Date Deposited: 28 Jun 2025 15:20
Last Modified: 28 Jun 2025 15:20
Item ID: 25842
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 31 June 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25842

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item