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Relational Ontology as a Bridge Between Realism and Empiricism in Scientific Explanation

Baron, Bautista (2025) Relational Ontology as a Bridge Between Realism and Empiricism in Scientific Explanation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper proposes that relational ontology, which defines existence through relations, serves as a bridge between scientific realism and empiricism by offering a structural criterion for scientific explanation. Through case studies in quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, we illustrate how relationality grounds scientific theories in empirical interactions while supporting realist commitments to unobservable structures. Engaging with philosophy of science debates—realism, reductionism, and demarcation—and drawing on thinkers such as Lakatos, Kuhn, Cartwright, van Fraassen, and contemporary authors like Ladyman and Chakravartty, this work examines the explanatory limits of relational ontology in addressing consciousness and contrasts scientific explanations with non-scientific accounts. Its original contribution lies in demonstrating how relational ontology unifies these perspectives through a rigorous structural criterion, advancing our understanding of scientific explanation within the philosophy of science.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Baron, Bautistabautistabaron80@gmail.com0009-0006-4691-4213
Keywords: relational ontology, scientific realism, empiricism, structural realism, scientific explanation, philosophy of science, demarcation problem, unobservable entities, empirical grounding, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, consciousness, structural criterion
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Explanation
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Bautista Baron
Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2025 13:21
Last Modified: 18 Jul 2025 13:21
Item ID: 25924
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Explanation
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 3 June 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25924

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