PhilSci Archive

Theoretical Virtues, Truth, and the Epistemic Aim of Scientific Theorizing

Mohammadian, Mousa (2025) Theoretical Virtues, Truth, and the Epistemic Aim of Scientific Theorizing. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1539-767X

[img] Text
theoretical-virtues-truth-and-the-epistemic-aim-of-scientific-theorizing.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication.

Download (376kB)

Abstract

I argue that the epistemic aim of scientific theorizing (EAST) is producing theories with the highest possible number and degree of theoretical virtues (call this “TV-EAST”). I trace TV-EAST’s logical empiricist origins and discuss its close connections to Kuhn’s and Laudan’s problem-solving accounts of the aim of science. Despite TV-EAST’s antirealist roots, I argue that if one adopts the realist view that EAST is finding true theories, one should also endorse TV-EAST. I then defend TV-EAST by showing that it addresses the challenges raised against using the “aim of science” metaphor and offers significant advantages over the realist account.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mohammadian, Mousa0000-0002-2422-4979
Keywords: Theoretical Virtues, Aim of Science, Scientific Theorizing, Semirealism
Subjects: General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Mousa Mohammadian
Date Deposited: 11 Jul 2025 13:09
Last Modified: 11 Jul 2025 13:09
Item ID: 25937
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Official URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2025.10094
Subjects: General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 2025
ISSN: 1539-767X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25937

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item