PhilSci Archive

Fairness and Signaling in Bargaining Games

Popa-Wyatt, Mihaela and Muhlenberd, Roland and Wyatt, Jeremy L/ and O'Connor, Cailin (2025) Fairness and Signaling in Bargaining Games. [Preprint]

[img] Text
FairSignalPreprint.pdf

Download (654kB)

Abstract

Cultural evolutionary models of bargaining can elucidate issues related to fairness and justice, and especially how fair and unfair conventions and norms might arise in human societies. One line of this research shows how the presence of social categories in such models creates inequitable equilibria that are not possible in models without social categories. This is taken to help explain why in human groups with social categories, inequity is the rule rather than the exception. But in previous models, it is typically assumed that these categories are rigid---in the sense that they cannot be altered, and easily observable---in the sense that all agents can identify each others' category membership. In reality, social categories are not always so tidy. We introduce evolutionary models where the tags connected with social categories can be flexible, variable, or difficult to observe, i.e., where these tags can carry different amounts of information about group membership. We show how alterations to these tags can undermine the stability of unfair conventions. We argue that these results can inform projects intended to ameliorate inequity, especially projects that seek to alter the properties of tags by promoting experimentation, imitation, and play with identity markers.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Popa-Wyatt, Mihaela
Muhlenberd, Roland
Wyatt, Jeremy L/
O'Connor, Cailincailino@uci.edu
Keywords: Bargaining, gender, race, game theory, inequity, unfairness, signaling
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Game Theory
Specific Sciences > Sociology
Depositing User: Dr. Cailin O'Connor
Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2025 13:03
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2025 13:03
Item ID: 26062
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Game Theory
Specific Sciences > Sociology
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26062

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item