de Canson, Chloé (2025) The Epistemic Grounds for Lay Interference in the Conduct of Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I present a heretofore untheorised form of lay science, called extitutional science, whereby lay scientists, by virtue of their collective experience, are able to detect errors committed by institutional scientists and attempt to have them corrected. I argue that the epistemic success of institutional science is enhanced to the extent that it takes up this extitutional criticism. Since this uptake does not occur spontaneously, extitutional interference in the conduct of institutional science is required. I make a proposal for how to secure this epistemically beneficial form of lay interference.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID de Canson, Chloé 0009-0006-1552-4933
Keywords:	Lay science, extitutional science, lay expertise, HIV/AIDS, Long COVID, myalgic encephalomyelitis, infection associated chronic conditions, reward system of science, social epistemology of science, standpoint theory
Subjects:	General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Chloé de Canson
Date Deposited:	13 Aug 2025 16:17
Last Modified:	13 Aug 2025 16:17
Item ID:	26214
Subjects:	General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26214

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