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Bad Polarization in Structurally Cohesive Communities

Michelini, Matteo and Polizzi, Eugenia and Vilone, Daniele (2025) Bad Polarization in Structurally Cohesive Communities. Synthese, 206 (2). ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Communities frequently experience belief polarization, even in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence supporting one side of the debate. Current explanations for this phenomenon, which we define bad polarization, attribute its emergence to the influence of social incentives on belief formation. However, these explanations presuppose the existence of a fragmented community in which opposing groups develop different beliefs. Here, we provide a model of belief formation in which social incentives bring about bad polarization even in structurally cohesive communities. We assume agents to distribute a finite amount of social support among their like-minded neighbors and to sample evidence partially in order to form the belief that grants them the highest possible support. Accordingly, we show that bad polarization emerges more frequently when communities are highly connected, and that bad believers, individuals holding unsupported beliefs, are consistently a minority. Bad polarization is driven by the competition for social support: bad believers form a minority because this allows them to gain a higher amount of support than if they adhered to the majority view.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Michelini, Matteomatteo.michelini@live.it0000-0002-3637-7745
Polizzi, Eugenia
Vilone, Daniele
Keywords: Bad Beliefs · Belief Polarization · Formal Social Epistemology · Agent-based Modeling · Socially Adaptive Beliefs · Social Incentives
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Specific Sciences > Sociology
Depositing User: Mr. Matteo Michelini
Date Deposited: 20 Aug 2025 13:28
Last Modified: 20 Aug 2025 13:28
Item ID: 26260
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-04977-w
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Specific Sciences > Sociology
Date: 2025
Volume: 206
Number: 2
ISSN: 1573-0964
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26260

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