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On Mechanisms, Pathways, and their Models

Glennan, Stuart (2025) On Mechanisms, Pathways, and their Models. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Lauren Ross has recently argued that the current philosophical enthusiasm for mechanisms poses a threat to a proper understanding of the diversity of causal structures found in biology, and of the diversity of ways in which biologists explain biological phenomena. Ross argues that new mechanists have collapsed a variety of distinct causal structures within the confining analytical strictures of mechanism, and in so doing have failed to appreciate the diversity of concepts and strategies needed to describe and explain biological phenomena. Ross grants that mechanisms are important in biology, but argues that there are other causal structures, like pathways and cascades, that are distinct from mechanisms, and that require distinctive treatments. In this paper I’ll argue that Ross’s worries arise from a failure to distinguish ontological questions about causal structure from methodological questions about modeling and explanation. I’ll argue that a mechanistic ontology is compatible with conceptual and explanatory pluralism, and along the way I will offer a new analysis of pathways and pathway models that draws on some of Ross’s insights.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Glennan, Stuartsglennan@butler.edu0000-0003-0292-6811
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Biology and Philosophy
Keywords: Mechanism, Pathway, Model, Causal Structure, Causal Explanation, Lauren Ross
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Stuart Glennan
Date Deposited: 07 Sep 2025 12:21
Last Modified: 07 Sep 2025 12:21
Item ID: 26589
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26589

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