Boge, Florian J. (2025) Rethinking Holism and Underdetermination. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Mature scientific hypotheses are confirmed by large amounts of independent evidence. How could anyone be an anti-realist under these conditions? A classic response appeals to confirmational holism and underdetermination, but it is unclear whether traditional arguments succeed. I offer a new line of argument: If holism is interpreted as saying that the confirmation of every part of a hypothesis depends on the confirmation of the whole hypothesis, we must formulate conditions under which the confirmation received by the whole can be transferred to its parts. However, underdetermination suggests that relevant conditions are typically not met. If this is true, the confirmation received by the whole remains bounded by the priors for the parts, and we lack compelling reasons to believe substantive hypotheses based on evidence beyond the degree to which the posits involved in them are antecedently believed. A rejoinder comes from selective realism: If some posit is preserved throughout theory change, it is confirmed beyond the degree to which the containing hypothesis is. However, the variant of holism considered here exactly implies that we cannot confirm such posits in isolation. As I will show, the realist is thus forced into a dilemma: Either she succumbs to the holistic challenge, or she must embrace meta-empirical facts, such as the posit's recurrence, as confirmatory.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Boge, Florian J. florian-johannes.boge@udo.edu 0000-0002-1030-3393
Additional Information:	This is the accepted manuscript version of a paper forthcoming in Synthese. The doi will be provided when available.
Keywords:	holism; underdetermination; selective realism; meta-empirical evidence
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Prof. Dr. Florian Boge
Date Deposited:	16 Sep 2025 10:28
Last Modified:	16 Sep 2025 10:28
Item ID:	26664
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26664

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• Rethinking Holism and Underdetermination. (deposited 13 Sep 2025 12:23)
  • Rethinking Holism and Underdetermination. (deposited 16 Sep 2025 10:28) [Currently Displayed]

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