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Biological Object as Real Patterns: Reconciling Processualism and Scientific Realism

Jiang, Yihan (2025) Biological Object as Real Patterns: Reconciling Processualism and Scientific Realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In recent years, the philosophy of biology has undergone a significant shift known as the
‘processual turn,’ largely influenced by the works of John Dupré and his collaborators
(Dupré, 2013, 2020; Nicholson and Dupré, 2018; Nicholson, 2019). Processualism argues
that dynamic processes, rather than static objects, form the fundamental ontology of
biological reality. This perspective, however, appears to be in tension with scientific realism,
at least in its standard form, which is committed to the existence of discrete, mind-
independent entities as posited in scientific theories. To reconcile these perspectives, I
propose that effective realism, particularly the framework based on the real pattern account
(Ladyman and Ross 2007; Wallace 2010), offers a promising solution. According to this
account, real patterns are defined by their utility—they are patterns that are indispensable for
formulating useful generalizations, enabling us to explain and predict phenomena efficiently.
These patterns are objective features of the world, but their recognition depends on the stance
or perspective we adopt, which is shaped by our explanatory purposes and cognitive tools. By
understanding biological objects as patterns of processes—stable, emergent features within
the dynamic flux of underlying processes—we can maintain a (minimal) realist commitment
to the entities posited by scientific theories without abandoning the processualist ontology.
Drawing on the real pattern account, I argue that interpreting objects as patterns of processes
resolves the tension between processualism and scientific realism, affirming the reality of
biological objects while preserving the primacy of processes. Meanwhile, this paper extends
the application of the real patterns framework by demonstrating its utility in addressing
specific challenges in the philosophy of biology. In doing so, it highlights how this
Dennettian legacy continues to profoundly enhance our understanding of the fundamental
reality revealed by the sciences.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Jiang, Yihanjiangyihan@ucas.ac.cn0009-0003-3050-4576
Keywords: Processualism; Scientific Realism; Real Patterns; Philosophy of Biology; Metaphysics
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Mr. Yihan Jiang
Date Deposited: 22 Sep 2025 10:54
Last Modified: 22 Sep 2025 10:54
Item ID: 26716
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26716

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