Schindler, Samuel (2025) Two Types of Natural Kind Discovery: Nobel Meets Kuhn. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Philosophers have spilled much ink over the discovery of ideas in the classical “context of discovery”. However, there has been little engagement with the question of what constitutes a discovery of “things in the world”. A much-overlooked answer to this question is provided by T.S. Kuhn. In this paper, I show that discoveries awarded with a Nobel Prize in Physics in the past 53 years accord with a basic premise of Kuhn's account and his distinction between two types of natural kind discoveries. I also draw normative conclusions for credit attribution in science.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | forthcoming in Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Keywords: | natural kind discovery, Kuhn, Nobel prizes, physics, theory and experiment, credit attribution | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Natural Kinds Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Depositing User: | Samuel Schindler | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2025 11:25 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 10 Oct 2025 11:25 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 26870 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Natural Kinds Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Date: | 2025 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26870 |
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