Cañas, Dubian (2025) Agency, relativism and extended knowledge. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 40 (2). pp. 130-153. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

I examine whether the theory of extended knowledge (TEK) can provide a fully satisfactory account of epistemic agency by combining active externalism and virtue reliabilism. TEK would be a fully satisfactory theory if it could explain how agents are epistemically responsible by both having and manifesting a cognitive disposition to appropriately respond to defeating reasons vis-à-vis their epistemic status. My negative thesis is that TEK fails to achieve this goal because its first-order explanatory principles lead to scepticism. As a result, the theory should be abandoned. My positive thesis, however, is that TEK can provide a fully satisfactory explanation of agency if epistemic relativism is adopted as a second-order principle. Although this manoeuvre involves adjusting the metaepistemology underlying TEK, it makes it possible to retain the combination of active externalism and virtue reliabilism that constitutes this epistemological theory.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Cañas, Dubian dubiandrescanas@gmail.com 0000-0002-2134-1045
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (Print)
Keywords:	Active externalism, Epistemic agency, Metaepistemology, Scepticism, Virtue reliabilism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Action Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Depositing User:	Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited:	15 Nov 2025 13:43
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2025 13:43
Item ID:	27148
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.26981
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Action Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Date:	2025
Page Range:	pp. 130-153
Volume:	40
Number:	2
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27148

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