Lewis, Peter J. (2006) Quantum Sleeping Beauty. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics both raise problems concerning subjective probability assignments. Furthermore, there are striking parallels between the two cases; in both cases personal experience has a branching structure, and in both cases the agent loses herself among the branches. However, the treatment of probability is very different in the two cases, for no good reason that I can see. Suppose, then, that we adopt the same treatment of probability in each case. Then the dominant ‘thirder’ solution to the Sleeping Beauty paradox becomes incompatible with the tenability of the many-worlds interpretation.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Lewis, Peter J.
Keywords:	Quantum mechanics, many worlds, Everett, probability, Sleeping Beauty paradox
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User:	Peter J. Lewis
Date Deposited:	23 Apr 2006
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID:	2715
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date:	April 2006
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2715

Commentary/Response Threads

• Lewis, Peter J. Quantum Sleeping Beauty. (deposited 23 Apr 2006) [Currently Displayed]
  • Papineau, David and Durà-Vilà, Víctor A thirder and an Everettian: a reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'. (deposited 29 Feb 2008)
    • Lewis, Peter J Reply to Papineau and Durà-Vilà. (deposited 16 Apr 2008)

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