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Arguments against the Value-Free Ideal

Elliott, Kevin (2025) Arguments against the Value-Free Ideal. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Debates about the cogency of the value-free ideal (VFI) have been central to the contemporary literature on values and science. This chapter provides an overview of the major arguments that have been leveled against the VFI and concludes on the basis of those arguments that it is very difficult to maintain the VFI in its traditional form. It is possible that alternative characterizations of the VFI could be developed and defended, but any plausible characterization of the VFI would have to allow for values to play significant roles in scientific reasoning and practice. Thus, moving forward it seems more fruitful to focus on exploring the best ways to manage value influences in science responsibly rather than debating the VFI.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Elliott, Kevinkce@msu.edu0000-0003-3397-7849
Keywords: value-free ideal; aims argument; argument from inductive risk; gap argument
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Feminist Approaches
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Kevin Elliott
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2025 11:56
Last Modified: 10 Nov 2025 11:56
Item ID: 27172
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Feminist Approaches
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27172

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