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Common Origin Inferences and the Material Theory of Induction

Norton, John D. (2025) Common Origin Inferences and the Material Theory of Induction. Philosophies, 10 (34). ISSN 2409-9287

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Abstract

The outstanding problem for common origin inferences (“COIs”) is to understand why they succeed when they do, and why they fail when they do. The material theory of induction provides a solution: COIs are warranted by background facts. Whether a COI succeeds or fails depends on the truth of its warranting propositions. Examples from matter theory and Newton’s Principia illustrate how COIs can fail; and an example from relativity theory illustrates a success. Hypotheses, according to the material theory, can be posited as a temporary expedient to initiate an inductive enterprise. This use of hypotheses enables COIs to serve as incentives for further research. It is illustrated with the example of the Copernican hypothesis.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Norton, John D.jdnorton@pitt.edu0000-0003-0936-5308
Additional Information: This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/).
Keywords: COI; common origin inference; material theory of induction
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: John Norton
Date Deposited: 13 Nov 2025 21:18
Last Modified: 13 Nov 2025 21:18
Item ID: 27214
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophies
Publisher: MDPI
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/ philosophies10050094
DOI or Unique Handle: doi.org/10.3390/ philosophies10050094
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
Date: 22 August 2025
Volume: 10
Number: 34
ISSN: 2409-9287
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27214

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