Norton, John D. (2024) The Rise and Fall of Karl Popper's Anti-inductivism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Karl Popper’s attempt to find an account of the rationality of science without inductive inference was a bold and philosophically rigorous response to the problem of induction. It was bound to fail since science is ineliminably an inductive enterprise. The failing lay not with scientists for using a defective argument form but with philosophers who were unable to account for the success of inductive inference. Such an account is provided by the material theory of induction.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Norton, John D. jdnorton@pitt.edu 0000-0003-0936-5308
Keywords:	falsifications, induction, inductive inference, Karl Popper
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User:	John Norton
Date Deposited:	13 Nov 2025 21:17
Last Modified:	13 Nov 2025 21:17
Item ID:	27217
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date:	3 November 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27217

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