Allzén, Simon (2025) Dark Matter Realism: How Referential Semantics Restricts Realism in Contemporary Fundamental Physics. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Philosophers increasingly treat semantics as decisive for realism about dark matter. In this paper, I consider a recent proposal from Vaynberg (2024) anchored in the causal-descriptive theory of reference from Psillos (1999, 2012). I argue that the application of Psillos’ general scientific realist framework in the local context of dark matter is misguided, partly because of the overlooked metaphysical commitments underpinning causal-descriptivism, and partly because the extension of ‘dark matter’ on this account includes entities we do not currently consider to be dark matter, and exclude entities that we currently consider could be dark matter. Furthermore, I argue that this discord between scientific realism and dark matter should be regarded endemic in contexts where empirical evidence is scarce: the semantic details required by the proposed scientific realism is dependent on canonical empirical confirmation, because it is against that background that scientific realism has been formulated and developed.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Dark Matter, Scientific Realism, Reference, Semantics | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Astrophysics Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Depositing User: | Dr Simon Allzén | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2025 13:37 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 19 Nov 2025 13:37 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 27251 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Astrophysics Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Date: | 19 November 2025 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27251 |
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