Norton, John D. (2006) Probability Disassembled. [Preprint]

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Abstract

While there is no universal logic of induction, the probability calculus succeeds as a logic of induction in many contexts through its use of several notions concerning inductive inference. They include Addition, through which low probabilities represent disbelief as opposed to ignorance; and Bayes property, which commits the calculus to a ‘refute and rescale’ dynamics for incorporating new evidence. These notions are independent and it is urged that they be employed selectively according to needs of the problem at hand. It is shown that neither is adapted to inductive inference concerning some indeterministic systems.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Norton, John D.
Keywords:	Induction confirmation probability indeterminism Bayes
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Depositing User:	John Norton
Date Deposited:	13 May 2006
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID:	2740
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Date:	May 2006
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2740

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