LeBrun, Alex (2025) Equivalent Theories and Ontological Commitment. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1539-767X

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Abstract

The literature on theoretical equivalence in philosophy of physics is replete with physical theories that look quite different but are purportedly equivalent. Plausibly, there might exist a pair of equivalent theories that look different insofar as they existentially quantify over different entities. However, given the preeminence of the quantificational theory of ontological commitment,
which tells us to look to quantified entities to inform ontology, such a pair of theories seems to be a problem. In this paper, I argue that there is no good way out of the problem, and I reject the quantificational theory of ontological commitment.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID LeBrun, Alex lebrun@ucsb.edu
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Dr. Alex LeBrun
Date Deposited:	12 Dec 2025 18:21
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2025 18:28
Item ID:	27428
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Publisher:	University of Chicago Press
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	2025
ISSN:	1539-767X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27428

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