Wilhelm, Isaac (2025) The Typical Principle. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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Abstract
If a proposition is typically true, given your evidence, then you should believe that proposition; or so I argue here. In particular, in this paper, I propose and defend a principle of rationality---call it the `Typical Principle'---which links rational belief to facts about what is typical. As I show, this principle avoids several problems that other, seemingly similar principles face. And as I show, in many cases, this principle implies the verdicts of the Principal Principle: so ultimately, the Typical Principle may be the more fundamental of the two.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | typicality, philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, rationality, Typical Principle, Principal Principle | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Depositing User: | Isaac Wilhelm | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 15 Dec 2025 20:25 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Dec 2025 20:25 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 27496 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Date: | 2025 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27496 |
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