Ross, Lauren N. (2025) Causal Pluralism: Primary and Secondary Features of Causation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

While references to “causal pluralism” are exceedingly common in the philosophical literature, these references make different claims that are not often distinguished and that have varying implications for causation debates. This paper provides an analysis of two distinct types of causal pluralism that are important in the life sciences. These include pluralism about the definition of causation and pluralism about “distinctions within causation”. These are referred to as definitional pluralism and distinctional (or secondary feature) pluralism, respectively. In capturing these causal pluralism types, and advancing causation topics more generally, a novel framework is introduced that differentiates primary and secondary features of causation. This primary and secondary feature distinction is examined and described in detail, it is explored in relation to mainstream philosophy of causation work, and it is used to provide clarity regarding common types of causal pluralism and types of causation in the life sciences.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Ross, Lauren N. rossl@uci.edu
Keywords:	causation; explanation; causal reasoning
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Depositing User:	Lauren N. Ross
Date Deposited:	16 Dec 2025 13:47
Last Modified:	16 Dec 2025 13:47
Item ID:	27509
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Date:	15 December 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27509

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