PhilSci Archive

Epistmic and Affective Advantages of Being Oppressed

Mossner, Carmen (2025) Epistmic and Affective Advantages of Being Oppressed. [Preprint]

[img] Text
CMossner_2025_Epistemic-and-affective-advantages-of-being-oppressed_ALWS.pdf

Download (4MB)

Abstract

Standpoint theorists claim that being oppressed, although characterised by disadvantages, can also offer a position of epistemic privilege, where, for instance, experiences of oppression can provide insights into the dynamics of oppressive structures. However, the literature has so far only focused on the epistemic dimension, treating affective experiences as mere contributors to knowledge about oppression. I challenge this narrow view by arguing that affective experiences of oppression harbour affective advantages that are not reducible to epistemic knowledge. In particular, I suggest that oppressed individuals experience a greater variety of emotions linked to oppression, while also experiencing them with a greater intensity. This can, for instance, foster a heightened sensitivity to structural changes, facilitate the development of tools for emotion regulation, and expand their affective repertoire in ways that enhances their empathic abilities. I further illustrate that these affective advantages are not merely a contributing factor to epistemic insights but hold an intrinsic value in themselves that are hardly accessible to non-oppressed groups. Crucially, recognising the value of affective experiences of oppressed individuals can aid in implementing a more just society.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mossner, Carmencmossner@uos.de0009-0001-7668-3974
Keywords: Epistemology; Standpoint Theory; Affectivity; Oppression; Epistemic Privileges
Subjects: General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User: Ms. Carmen Mossner
Date Deposited: 03 Jan 2026 02:18
Last Modified: 03 Jan 2026 02:18
Item ID: 27702
Subjects: General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date: August 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27702

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item