Arroyo, Raoni and Arenhart, Jonas R. B. (2025) Two quantum-mechanical arguments against the metaphysical equivalence between substratum and bundle theories of individuality. [Preprint]
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Abstract
It is a widespread consensus among metaphysicians that the bundle and substratum theories are substantially different metaphysical theories of individuality. In a realist stance towards metaphysics, they cannot both track the truth when describing fundamental reality, thus they’re rival metaphysical theories. Against that consensus, Jiri Benovsky has advanced a metametaphysical thesis that they are in fact metaphysically equivalent. This paper challenges Benovsky’s equivalence thesis with two counter-arguments based on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics: quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and wavefunction realism. As we shall argue, while both substratum and bundle theories arguably fail in standard quantum mechanics, they fail in different ways. Hence, given Benovsky’s own notion of metaphysical equivalence, they are not equivalent.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | Metaphysical equivalence; Metametaphysics; Metaphysics of quantum mechanics; Substratum and bundle theories of individuality; Metaphysical underdetermination | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Raoni Arroyo | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jan 2026 16:14 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 09 Jan 2026 16:14 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 27836 | |||||||||
| Official URL: | https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/articl... | |||||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.36446/af.e1203 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics |
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| Date: | August 2025 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27836 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Two quantum-mechanical arguments against the metaphysical equivalence between substratum and bundle theories of individuality. (deposited 04 Aug 2025 13:03)
- Two quantum-mechanical arguments against the metaphysical equivalence between substratum and bundle theories of individuality. (deposited 09 Jan 2026 16:14) [Currently Displayed]
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