Chaturvedi, Tushar and Kashyap, Abhishek (2026) Conciliation without command. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In the epistemology of peer disagreement, Conciliationism holds that discovering a
disagreement with an epistemic peer rationally requires substantial revision in one’s
credence. A novel explanation for this rational requirement, Accountability Thesis
(Peter, Synthese 190(7):1253-1266, 2013), argues that it is grounded in irreduc-
ibly second-personal reasons arising from a relationship of mutual accountability
between deliberating agents. This essay challenges this second-personal approach,
arguing in favour of an explanation that invokes no irreducibly second-personal
reasons. The alternative explanation, which appeals only to third-personal evidence
and first-personal norms of rationality, is argued to be explanatorily superior. It is
more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory scope, accounting for cases
Accountability Thesis cannot, such as disagreement with absent epistemic peers.
Furthermore, it provides a more complete account by integrating the dual evidential
role of peer disagreement as both first-order testimonial evidence and higher-order
evidence of one’s own fallibility. The essay does not argue that there could be no
procedural epistemic obligations in deliberation with epistemic peers; such a claim
would rule out other plausible understandings of epistemic peerhood. Nonetheless,
it concludes that insofar as argument for Accountability Thesis operates within a
standard Conciliationist framework, its second-personal explanation for Conciliationism does not succeed.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Chaturvedi, Tushar c.tushar@iitg.ac.in 0000-0002-6773-7416 Kashyap, Abhishek kshyp.abhshk@gmail.com 0000-0003-3104-6311
Keywords:	Conciliationism · Peer disagreement · Accountability thesis · Second- person standpoint · Independence principle · Calibration principle · Epistemic practices
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Mr. Tushar Chaturvedi
Date Deposited:	12 Feb 2026 12:09
Last Modified:	12 Feb 2026 12:09
Item ID:	28219
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05469-1
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	9 February 2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/28219

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