Ruyant, Quentin (2026) What’s Wrong with the Semantic Conception of Scientific Theories: Towards a Pragmatic View. Erkenntnis. ISSN 0165-0106

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Abstract

In contrast to the syntactic conception of scientific theories, the semantic conception posits that theories are not statements about the world, but families of models. Recent debates have tended to blur the differences between these two views. Practice-oriented philosophers of science have also challenged both views, arguing that models are central to science, but autonomous from theories. However, they have not proposed any alternative. This article aims to sharpen the challenges faced by the semantic view, with the goal of paving the way for a truly pragmatic conception of theories. I examine various ways in which a focus on models could make the semantic view distinct from the syntactic view. Ultimately, both views share the same resources for individuating theories, account equally well for different levels of abstraction, and face similar issues regarding the relation between formal representation and informal experience. I contend that the only relevant contrast lies not between linguistic and non-linguistic representation, but between descriptive and schematic representation, which ultimately favours a pragmatic view by implying a role for context in theoretical interpretation. I outline an account of schematic representation that could serve as a foundation for a pragmatic conception of theories.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Ruyant, Quentin quentin.ruyant@gmail.com
Keywords:	Conceptions of scientific theories Semantic view Syntactic view Pragmatic view Models Idealizations
Subjects:	General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Mr. Quentin Ruyant
Date Deposited:	02 Mar 2026 13:34
Last Modified:	02 Mar 2026 13:34
Item ID:	28410
Journal or Publication Title:	Erkenntnis
Publisher:	Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-0...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1007/s10670-026-01079-y
Subjects:	General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	2026
ISSN:	0165-0106
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/28410

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