Herrera, Manuel
(2026)
Identity Supersubstantivalism and the Ontology of Fields.
[Preprint]
Abstract
This paper develops a renewed ontological framework for field theories within the context of Identity Supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are numerically identical to spacetime regions and that spacetime constitutes a plenum. Standard ontologies of fields—the Property View, the Stuff View, and the Substantial Entity View—are examined and shown to be inadequate, for different reasons, as fully articulated supersubstantivalist readings of field theories. In response, the paper proposes the Refined Property View of Field (RPVF), a renewed version of the Property View that preserves the conception of fields as collections of properties while offering a more explicit account of the ontological status of the substance in which those properties inhere. According to RPVF, there exists a single spatiotemporal-material substance, internally structured into points that function as localized subjects of inherence for both geometric and material properties. Grounded in a classical substance–attribute framework, RPVF renders intelligible both the numerical identity between matter and spacetime and the plenitude thesis, while avoiding the metaphysical indeterminacies of the standard Property View. The result is a robust supersubstantivalist interpretation of classical field theories.
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