Earman, John (2026) The Unprincipled Principle of Common Cause. [Preprint]
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The Unprincipled PCC 4.1.26.pdf Download (1MB) |
Abstract
Reichenbach introduced common cause reasoning in Experience and Prediction (1938) as part of an argument for scientific realism. In The Direction of Time (1956) common cause reasoning becomes an inference principle holding that statistical dependence between simultaneous events demands a common causal explanation. The principle of common cause (PCC) gives the appearance of precision through four probabilistic conditions that a common cause must satisfy, but closer analysis reveals significant vagueness and ambiguity that make it difficult to evaluate putative counterexamples. And sadly the PCC is prostituted in an attempt to derive relations of temporal precedence from statistical relations. Reichenbach also neglected alternative explanations of statistical dependence and failed to address cases where such dependence is so pervasive that its ubiquity, rather than any particular instance, is the primary explanatory challenge. One not unreasonable reaction would be to walk away from what is obviously a big sprawling mess. Such a reaction, however, is shortsighted. For as I will illustrate, examining how common cause type explanations fare in the theories of modern physics can be useful in illuminating a range of foundations issues.
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