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Dark Matter Realism: How Referential Semantics Restricts Realism in Contemporary Fundamental Physics

Allzén, Simon (2026) Dark Matter Realism: How Referential Semantics Restricts Realism in Contemporary Fundamental Physics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Philosophers increasingly treat semantics as decisive for realism about dark matter. I examine a recent proposal by Vaynberg (2024) anchored in Psillos’ causal–descriptive theory of reference Psillos (1999, 2012). I argue that, on the strong reference-fixing (kind-constitutive) reading required by semantic dark matter realism, the proposed ΛCDM-motivated core description does not do the work assigned to it. It is compatible with entities we do not count as dark matter, and it excludes entities treated as live candidates in the contemporary landscape of models. I close by suggesting that this discrepancy between realist semantics and dark matter may be part in a general pattern in empirically scarce domains — the semantic specificity required by this realist strategy depends on forms of canonical confirmation that are not yet available.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Allzén, Simonsimon.allzen@philosophy.su.se0000-0002-6124-8152
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Synthese
Keywords: Dark Matter, Scientific Realism, Reference, Semantics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Astrophysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Dr Simon Allzén
Date Deposited: 13 Apr 2026 12:37
Last Modified: 13 Apr 2026 12:37
Item ID: 29095
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Astrophysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 13 April 2026
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29095

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