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Two interventionist modes of counterfactual evaluation for causal strength

Lu, Qiaoying (2026) Two interventionist modes of counterfactual evaluation for causal strength. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Recent work on interventionist causation has moved beyond the simple cause/non-cause distinction toward comparisons of causal strength. This paper develops an interventionist account of causal strength, grounded in counterfactual evaluation within the framework of structural causal models. I begin by examining Judea Pearl’s counterfactual formalism for causal necessity and sufficiency and argue that it does not, by itself, capture the kinds of general causal comparisons scientists often seek. I then show why Woodward’s notion of counterfactuals is needed for a more comprehensive interventionist analysis. On this basis, I distinguish two modes of counterfactuals and their evaluations. Pearl’s counterfactuals, whose evaluation corresponds to the probability of sufficiency (PS) and the probability of necessity (PN), incorporate factual information and are best suited for singular causal inquiries. By contrast, Woodward’s counterfactuals are defined independently of factual conditioning and support general causal comparisons. I introduce corresponding measures: the probability of interventional sufficiency (PIS) and the probability of interventional necessity (PIN). By clarifying how general and singular strength reasoning are connected, the paper resolves an apparent tension between Woodward’s and Pearl’s approaches and yields a unified interventionist framework for evaluating causal strength in scientific contexts.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lu, Qiaoyingqiaoy.lu@gmail.com
Keywords: interventionism; counterfactual; causal sufficiency; causal necessity; singular vs. general causation
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Ms. Qiaoying Lu
Date Deposited: 11 May 2026 12:40
Last Modified: 11 May 2026 12:40
Item ID: 29552
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Date: 2026
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29552

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