LE NEPVOU, Alexandre (2026) Residual Empiricism and the Bearer of Scientific Acceptance From Empirical Adequacy to Objectivating Adequacy. [Preprint]
![[img]](https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
EmpiricismResidual.pdf Download (234kB) |
Abstract
Constructive empiricism restricts the belief involved in scientific acceptance: to accept
a theory is not to believe that it is true, but only that it is empirically adequate. I argue that this
restriction is correct but incomplete. It restricts the doxastic force of acceptance, while leaving its
bearer at the level of whole theories. Drawing on van Fraassen’s semantic conception of theories,
his later account of scientific representation, measurement, and perspective, and his conception
of empiricism as a stance rather than a factual thesis, I argue that acceptance should instead
be directed at classes of objectivating content: contents stable across admissible formulations,
models, mediations, measurements, and uses. Such a view yields a residual empiricism that is
stronger than mere empirical adequacy, because it requires public objectivation, but weaker than
scientific realism, because objectivating adequacy does not entail ontological commitment. The
argument is situated against debates on scientific realism, selective realism, structural realism,
robustness, and scientific representation.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
||||||
| Keywords: | constructive empiricism; scientific realism; van Fraassen; empirical adequacy; empirical stance; scientific acceptance; scientific representation; measurement; robustness; perspective; objectivation. | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
||||||
| Depositing User: | Mr Alexandre LE NEPVOU | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 16 May 2026 12:10 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 16 May 2026 12:10 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 29656 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
||||||
| Date: | May 2026 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29656 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}