Springle, Alison and Goldwasser, Seth (2026) Mental Kinds as Human Kinds: The Case from Declarative Memory. In: UNSPECIFIED.

Text Memory as a Human Kind (2) (2).docx Download (3MB)

Abstract

While mental disorders like schizophrenia are paradigmatic human kinds, the going view of human mental kinds like declarative memory is that they are not human kinds. This essay challenges the going view by arguing that declarative memory bears the distinguishing marks of a human kind. We propose that a “constructionist-functionalist” metaphysics for mental kinds like declarative memory can be articulated on the model of existing accounts of other constructed kinds. Finally, we argue that such a metaphysics addresses the more pressing objections to our claim that mental kinds like declarative memory may properly be considered human kinds.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Springle, Alison aas524@miami.edu 0000-0002-9880-1417 Goldwasser, Seth sxg2215@miami.edu 0000-0002-5644-7499
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory General Issues > Natural Kinds Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
Depositing User:	Dr. Seth Goldwasser
Date Deposited:	31 May 2026 12:49
Last Modified:	31 May 2026 12:49
Item ID:	29839
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory General Issues > Natural Kinds Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
Date:	2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29839

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