Potochnik, Angela (2026) Abandoning Veritism. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Many of our best scientific explanations incorporate idealizations. Philosophers
disagree about whether and to what extent we must thus give up on truth as a
prerequisite for scientific explanation and understanding. Here I propose reframing this debate. Factivism or veritism about explanation is not an obvious view to be given up only under duress. Rather, it is philosophically fruitful to emphasize how departures from the truth facilitate explanation and, alongside it, understanding. The onus should be on veritists to show why it is philosophically important to sideline the contributions idealizations make to scientific explanation and understanding.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Potochnik, Angela 0000-0002-0448-591X
Keywords:	idealization, veritism, factivism, scientific explanation, scientific understanding
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User:	Angela Potochnik
Date Deposited:	09 Jun 2026 11:32
Last Modified:	09 Jun 2026 11:32
Item ID:	30002
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date:	2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/30002

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