Esser, Stephen (2026) Turning Salmon’s Causal Process Theory into Process Ontology. [Preprint]
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Abstract
There is a contemporary movement among philosophers, inspired by biology, to advocate for a process-based metaphysics. These theorists argue that standard approaches (object or substance-based) are inadequate because they posit static building blocks and hence do not adequately capture the dynamic nature of biological systems. There is disagreement, however, about how to formulate a process ontology, particularly with regard to the question of how processes can be theorized as persisting amid change. Dupré (2021) recently approached the topic from another vantage point by considering the applicability to biology of causal process accounts, such as those developed by Salmon and Dowe. These theories, developed to support scientific explanation, are often viewed as having limited scope outside physics, but Dupré argues for their affinity with biological phenomena, supported by a number of examples. His discussion applies a basic framework of powerful processes interacting to produce change, but does not detail how causal process theories might be revised or supplemented to address key foundational questions in process ontology. To help fill this gap, a modified version of Salmon’s original theory is offered to address some of these questions. In addition, the relationship between the resulting account and causal explanatory frameworks for biology and physics is assessed.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Process ontology, Causation, Persistence, Mechanisms, Scientific Explanation | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Stephen Esser | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2026 19:37 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 22 Jun 2026 19:37 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 30254 | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s11229-026-05691-x | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation |
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| Date: | 22 June 2026 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/30254 |
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