Norton, John D. (2006) Induction without Probabilities. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
A simple indeterministic system is displayed and it is urged that we cannot responsibly infer inductively over it if we presume that the probability calculus is the appropriate logic of induction. The example illustrates the general thesis of a material theory of induction, that the logic appropriate to a particular domain is determined by the facts that prevail there.
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Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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Additional Information: | For updates, please go to http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton | ||||||
Keywords: | Confirmation Induction Determinism Bayes Probability | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism |
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Depositing User: | John Norton | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 23 Dec 2006 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:14 | ||||||
Item ID: | 3107 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism |
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Date: | 2006 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3107 |
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