Kinouchi, Renato (2007) Peirce in the long run: remarks on knowledge a ulteriori. In: UNSPECIFIED.

Preview

PDF Kinouchi_LSE.pdf Download (202kB)

Abstract

Knowledge a priori has an important role in rationalistic schools: it pre-establishes truth in order to justify a system of correlated ideas. Empiricism usually concerns knowledge a posteriori, for experience itself is what we have actually known. Peirce’s probabilistic approach to science was based on necessity in the long run but it has no clear place in the categorization of knowledge either as a priori or as a posteriori. This deficit should be overcome by introducing a new category — synthetic knowledge a ulteriori, defined as what is known about an indefinite number of cases but not about isolated instances.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Kinouchi, Renato
Keywords:	Probability. Induction. Synthetic Judgments. C. S. Peirce.
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Renato Kinouchi
Date Deposited:	08 Feb 2007
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID:	3166
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	2007
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3166

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item