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Causation With a Human Face

Woodward, James (2007) Causation With a Human Face. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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What is the relationship between, on the one hand, the sorts of causal claims found in the special sciences (and in common sense) and, on the other hand, the world as described by physics? A standard picture goes like this: the fundamental laws of physics are causal laws in the sense that they can be interpreted as telling us that realizations of one set of physical factors or properties “causes” realizations of other properties. Causal claims in the special sciences are then true (to the extent that they are) in virtue of “instantiating” these underlying causal laws; as it is often put, the latter serve as “truth-makers” for the former. The picture is thus one according to which the notion of cause, as it occurs in the special sciences, is reflected or “grounded” in a fairly straightforward and transparent way in a similar notion that occurs in fundamental physics. This paper explores some alternatives to this picture

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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Woodward, James
Keywords: causation, interventionism
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Depositing User: Jim Woodward
Date Deposited: 20 Jul 2008
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:16
Item ID: 3844
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Date: 2007

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