Frost-Arnold, Greg (2008) The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

There are certain explanations that scientists do not accept, even though such explanations do not conflict with observation, logic, or other scientific theories. I argue that a common version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism relies upon just such an explanation. First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans neither generates novel predictions nor unifies apparently disparate phenomena. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions, and fails to unify disparate phenomena. Third, Psillos, Boyd, and other proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Frost-Arnold, Greg
Keywords:	realism, antirealism, inference to the best explanation, naturalism
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Greg Frost-Arnold
Date Deposited:	31 Oct 2008
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:17
Item ID:	4268
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2008
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4268

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