Reydon, Thomas (2008) How to Fix Kind Membership: A Problem for HPC-Theory and a Solution. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Natural kinds are often contrasted with other kinds of scientific kinds, especially functional kinds, because of a presumed categorical difference in explanatory value: natural kinds can ground explanations, while other kinds of kinds cannot. I argue against this view of natural kinds by examining a particular type of explanation – mechanistic explanations – and showing that functional kinds do the same work there as natural kinds are supposed to do in more standard scientific explanations. Breaking down the categorical distinction between natural kinds and other kinds of kinds, I argue, delivers two goods: It provides us with a view of natural kindhood that does justice to the epistemic roles of kinds in scientific explanations. And it allows us to solve a problem that HPC-theory, currently one of the most popular accounts of natural kindhood, confronts.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Reydon, Thomas
Keywords:	natural kinds
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User:	Thomas Reydon
Date Deposited:	04 Nov 2008
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:17
Item ID:	4301
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation
Date:	2008
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4301

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