Beisbart, Claus (2009) Kant’s Characterization of Natural Ends. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

What is it to judge something to be a natural end? And what objects may properly be judged natural ends? These questions pose a challenge, because the predicates “natural” and “end” seemingly can not be instantiated at the same time – at least given some Kantian assumptions. My paper defends the thesis that Kant’s “Critique of Teleological Judgment” (CTJ), nevertheless, provides a sensible account of judging something a natural end. On the account, a person judges an object O a natural end, if she thinks that the parts of O cause O and if she is committed to approach O in a top-down manner, as if the parts were produced in view of the whole. The account is non-realist, because it involves a commitment. With the account comes a characterization that provides necessary and sufficient conditions on objects that may properly be judged natural ends. My paper reconstructs the argument in CTJ, §§64-65 where the account and the characterization are derived.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Beisbart, Claus
Keywords:	teleology, Critique of Judgment, holism
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Depositing User:	Claus Beisbart
Date Deposited:	25 Apr 2009
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:17
Item ID:	4584
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Date:	2009
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4584

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