Psillos, Stathis (2009) Choosing the Realist Framework. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a way empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Schlick, Feigl, Reichenbach, empiricism, scientific realism, no miracles argument. | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism |
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| Depositing User: | Dr Ioannis Votsis | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 28 May 2009 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:18 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 4661 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism |
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| Date: | 2009 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4661 |
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