Devitt, Michael
(2009)
ARE UNCONCEIVED ALTERNATIVES A PROBLEM FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM?
In: UNSPECIFIED.
Abstract
Kyle Stanford starts his a recent book, Exceeding Our Grasp, with the claim that “the most powerful challenge to scientific realism has yet to be formulated” (2006: 9). He goes on to formulate what he takes to be that challenge, offering a version of the pessimistic meta-induction that includes elements from the underdetermination argument. I have previously labeled the meta-induction “the most powerful argument against scientific realism”. I did so because “it rests on plausible claims about the history of science”. Stanford brings out just how plausible such claims can be. I think his version of the meta-induction is indeed the most powerful challenge. However, I think the challenge can be met. I shall be drawing on earlier discussions in “Scientific Realism” (2005) and Realism and Truth (1997). I start by setting out what I take scientific realism to be, followed by a brief summary of my response to the underdetermination argument against it. The paper begins in earnest with my response to the pessimistic meta-induction. Against this background, I will turn to Stanford’s argument.
Item Type: |
Conference or Workshop Item
(UNSPECIFIED)
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Creators: |
Creators | Email | ORCID |
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Devitt, Michael | | |
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Depositing User: |
Justin Sytsma
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Date Deposited: |
03 Jul 2009 |
Last Modified: |
07 Oct 2010 15:18 |
Item ID: |
4745 |
Date: |
2009 |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4745 |
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