Lewis, Peter J. (2009) A note on the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]
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Abstract
I argue that the Doomsday argument fails because it fails to take into account the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, confirmation, self-location. | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
Depositing User: | Peter J. Lewis | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 14 Jul 2009 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:18 | ||||||
Item ID: | 4761 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
Date: | July 2009 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4761 |
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- A note on the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 14 Jul 2009) [Currently Displayed]
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