Kelp, Christoph and Douven, Igor (2010) Sustaining a Rational Disagreement. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Kelp, Christoph Douven, Igor
Keywords:	social epistemology; peer disagreement
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Igor Douven
Date Deposited:	30 Mar 2010
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:19
Item ID:	5231
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	2010
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5231

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