Arnold, Eckhart (2010) Discussion: Can the Best-Alternative-Justification solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising New Approach. [Preprint]

Preview

PDF Induktionsproblem_Preprint.pdf Download (253kB)

Abstract

In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Arnold, Eckhart
Additional Information:	accepted (April 30th 2010) by the Philosophy of Science Journal (The accepted version does not contain chapter 2 any more, which just briefly restates the essentials of Schurz' approach - I left it in here so that the discussion note can be understood without prior reading of Schurz' paper)
Keywords:	Hume's Problem, Problem of Induction, Prediction Games, Best Alternative Justification
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Eckhart Arnold
Date Deposited:	14 May 2010
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:19
Item ID:	5350
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	February 2010
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5350

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item