Hitchcock, Christopher and Knobe, Joshua (2009) Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy, 11. pp. 587-612.

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Abstract

A series of recent studies indicate that people's moral judgments can impact their causal intuitions. We offer a new theoretical model to explain these phenomena. At the core of the model is the notion of a *norm* (understood as incorporating both statistical and evaluative elements). It is then suggested that (a) people's judgments about the relevance of counterfactuals depend on norms and (b) people's causal intuitions depend on counterfactual reasoning. Taken together, these two claims make it possible to explain certain puzzling aspects of people's causal cognition.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Hitchcock, Christopher Knobe, Joshua
Keywords:	Causation, Causal Cognition, Experimental Philosophy
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Joshua Knobe
Date Deposited:	27 Oct 2010 12:03
Last Modified:	27 Oct 2010 12:03
Item ID:	8352
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Philosophy
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	2009
Page Range:	pp. 587-612
Volume:	11
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8352

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