McKenzie, Kerry (2011) Arguing Against Fundamentality. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper aims to open up discussion on the relationship between fundamentality and naturalism, and in particular on the question of whether fundamentality may be denied on naturalistic grounds. A historico-inductive argument for an anti-fundamentalist conclusion, prominent within contemporary metaphysical literature, is examined; finding it wanting, an alternative ‘internal’ strategy is proposed. By means of an example from the history of modern physics - namely S-matrix theory - it is demonstrated that (1) this strategy can generate similar (though not identical) anti-fundamentalist conclusions on more defensible naturalistic grounds, and (2) that fundamentality questions can be empirical questions. Some implications and limitations of the proposed approach are discussed.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID McKenzie, Kerry ph07km@leeds.ac.uk
Keywords:	fundamentality, particle physics, metaphysics of science
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Fields and Particles General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User:	Miss Kerry McKenzie
Date Deposited:	02 Dec 2011 14:43
Last Modified:	02 Dec 2011 14:43
Item ID:	8861
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Fields and Particles General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date:	September 2011
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8861

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